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TWICE GRILLED
J. Thomas Sullivan*
I was fortunate enough to argue two cases before the Court
in successive years, a circumstance that I suspect is quite rare for
an unknown private practitioner. The experiences have blurred
in my memory over time, likely due in no small part to the fact
that I lost both cases, but I will try to separate the highlights
here.
I do remember that any trip to the Court is indeed an
awesome experience. My labor law professor, Charles J. Morris,
had commented in class about the honor of arguing before the
Court and then tossed out the suggestion that we, too, would be
able to argue a case before the Court one day. His rather
simplistic assurance on this point came back to me when I was
notified that my first cert petition had been granted. I also
remember the sleepless night before that argument; my
premature attempts to awaken so that I would be sure to avoid
being late; the back-up wake-up call my wife, Suzy, gave me
that morning. How foolish she was to ask if I had slept well.
The concerns common to most counsel arguing before the
Court were complicated before my first argument by a problem
that I can say with some assurance is unique. Three days before
my flight to Washington, I was playing with my then one-yearold daughter Molly. A toy she particularly liked had a suction
cup on it, and I plopped it onto my forehead to make her laugh.
She laughed enthusiastically, bouncing the toy in every which
direction trying to pull it off while I steadfastly remained in
control of the device for some matter of minutes. When I finally
dislodged the thing, it had left a large, well-defined red circle in
the middle of my forehead that looked exactly like a target. For
the next two days, we tried everything to make the mark go
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away, but nothing seemed to work. I was worried that the Court
might observe me as some kind of nut showing up pre-targeted
for oral argument, but thankfully, it disappeared the day of my
flight to Washington.
I remember that once I saw it, and then stepped inside it,
the Court's impressive building gave me the feeling that this is a
place where something very important happens. I think I would
have had that feeling even if I had not been a lawyer, even if I
had not been there to argue a case that morning. I realized again
how much was at stake for my client, and imagining worst-case
scenarios, I was quite relieved when I saw a sign indicating that
the Supreme Court has a full-time tailor in residence. I put my
fears about a ripped seam aside.
I still recall my first appearance at the Court as the worst
oral argument I have ever delivered, and one of the worst
experiences of my life. I should have won, because I was able to
rely on Brown v. Ohio,' a decision favorable to my client that
was almost directly on point. I was also sustained in my
optimism by two other decisions, Waller v. Florida2 and
Robinson v. Neil,3 written by Chief Justice Burger and thenJustice Rehnquist, respectively. Both supported my client's
argument that his conviction for driving while intoxicated barred
a later prosecution for vehicular manslaughter based on the same
incident. Regrettably, Justice Powell, who had written the
majority opinion in Brown, was ill on the day I argued, and I
have always wondered whether his absence made a difference,
because I lost on a split decision.
Once the case was called, I found myself a total wreck.
While my friend and co-counsel Henry Quintero5 sat
comfortably at counsel table after pocketing one of the quill
pens, I drank most of the water available at the podium in a vain
attempt to moisten my dry throat, and focused on willing my
knees to hold me up. I was not in good shape, and I remember
that Justice White didn't provide much help. Referring to Illinois
1. 432 U.S. 161 (1977).

2. 397 U.S. 387 (1970).
3. 409 U.S. 505 (1973).
4. Fugate v. N.M., 470 U.S. 904 (1985) (per curiam).
5. Henry Quintero has recently been appointed a district judge for the Sixth Judicial
District of New Mexico.
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v. Vitale,6 another leading case that supported our position, I

pronounced Vitale using two syllables, just as Dick Vitale, the
omnipresent basketball commentator, pronounces his name.
Justice White, after pointedly spearing me during my opening
sentence to the Court,7 used a three-syllable approach to Vitale
when he mentioned the case. Things went downhill from there.
Justice Marshall, whom I shall always respect as a lawyer
who not only served on the Court, but argued before it, pointed
out that the accident victim had not died until after the resolution
of the DUI case, and asked the understandable question: "How
can you have a homicide if no one's dead?" 8 I could only tell
him that this was just the way the New Mexico legislature had
written the vehicular homicide statute. It wasn't a convincing
response.
I couldn't later explain to my client the four votes to affirm
the New Mexico Supreme Court's holding, which relied on a
1912 decision from the occupation of the Philippines that
seemed to have been overruled by implication in the large body
of far more recent double-jeopardy law. I can't explain it now
either, but I do know that Fugate remains a constitutional rule
that may well apply only in New Mexico.
The following year, New Mexico's Attorney General Paul
Bardacke and I met in the Court again when we argued New
Mexico v. Earnest.9 General Bardacke, as Justice Rehnquist
called him during questioning, had asked me some weeks before
if I planned to use the reserved seats to which I was entitled. I
had not even been aware that I had reserved seats, having
overlooked that part of the instructions to counsel. When I
indicated that I had no use for the tickets, he asked if I might
cede them to him, and I agreed. Then he explained that Michael
Douglas, who had been his roommate at Berkeley, wanted to
attend the argument. If only I had been able to finish my script
6. 447 U.S. 410 (1980).
7. I was stating the issue when he abruptly asked, "Isn't that why we're here?"
8. One of the recognized exceptions to the application of double jeopardy arises when
a critical evidentiary fact-in this case, for example, the victim's death--occurs after the
initial prosecution on the lesser offense. Oddly, the New Mexico vehicular homicide statute
provided when Fugate was decided that a defendant could be prosecuted for causing either
death or serious bodily injury. Because the victim had been seriously injured in the
accident, Fugate could have been prosecuted for manslaughter when the DUI was pending.
9. 477 U.S. 648 (1986).
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by then! But instead of writing dialogue, I had been writing
briefs. I even forgot to ask Paul if he would introduce me to
Douglas.
My other clear memory of the events leading up to the
argument in Earnest is of the pre-game that takes place in the
Clerk's chambers, where the lawyers scheduled for the grill that
day assemble, get some basic directions, and say their prayers. I
know I said one. Then the fellow standing in line before me
remarked that the only advice he had been given by the senior
partners in his law firm was that the Chief Justice despised
button-down collars. He frowned with mild dismay as he
suddenly noticed the button-down collar on my brand-new white
shirt, and said, "I guess I shouldn't have mentioned that."
Well, it didn't matter. I gave as good an appellate argument
as I can, relying on Supreme Court authority indicating that a
non-testifying co-defendant's confession could not be admitted
as substantive evidence at trial in the absence of a meaningful
opportunity for cross-examination. When asked if the New
Mexico trial courts had applied the penal-interest exception to
admit accomplice confessions in other cases, I looked over at
my co-counsel and friend, Susan Gibbs. She shook her head no,
allowing me to give a negative answer. She also took one of the
quill pens, but this time I drank no water, and my knees held up.
I remember that I found it hard to sit quietly in my seat at
counsel table during Bardacke's rebuttal. I almost always
represent criminal defendants who have lost in the lower court,
so I cherish rebuttal. Yet on the day when I delivered my best
and most important argument, I was denied the opportunity for
one last plea. I wish I had been given the chance, because the
Court vacated the reversal I had won at the New Mexico
Supreme Court, and I lost on remand.' °
Unlike Fugate, in which no great issues of constitutional
consequence were actually implicated in the argument, the
Earnest litigation grew out of a longstanding question in
Confrontation Clause analysis: Should the statements of
accomplices be admitted into evidence when the defendant has
10. State v. Earnest, 744 P.2d 539 (N.M. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 924 (1987).
Earnest also lost on his Confrontation Clause claim when he raised it later in a federal
habeas proceeding. Earnest v. Dorsey, 87 F.3d 1113 (1Oth Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519
U.S. 1016 (1996).
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had no opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses? Four
members of the Court concluded later in Lilly v. Virginia" that
accomplice statements cannot be admitted in the absence of
cross-examination. And Justice Scalia, concurring, noted that he
would not
allow such statements to be admitted if made to the
2
police.1
I was heartened by the result in Lilly, but also disappointed.
It seems clear to me that Ralph Earnest would win if his case
came to the Supreme Court today. He wouldn't be serving a life
sentence. He would be free.

IH. 527 U.S. 116(1999).
12. Id. at 143 (Scalia, J., concurring).

